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Abstract
Lu and Boutilier [LB11] proposed a novel approach based on “minimax regret” to use
classical score based voting rules in the setting where preferences can be any partial (in-
stead of complete) orders over the set of alternatives. We show here that such an approach
is vulnerable to a new kind of manipulation which was not present in the classical (where
preferences are complete orders) world of voting. We call this attack “manipulative elicita-
tion.” More specifically, it may be possible to (partially) elicit the preferences of the agents in
a way that makes some distinguished alternative win the election who may not be a winner
if we elicit every preference completely. More alarmingly, we show that the related com-
putational task is polynomial time solvable for a large class of voting rules which includes
all scoring rules, maximin, Copelandα for every α ∈ [0, 1], simplified Bucklin voting rules,
etc. We then show that introducing a parameter per pair of alternatives which specifies the
minimum number of partial preferences where this pair of alternatives must be comparable
makes the related computational task of manipulative elicitation NP-complete for all com-
mon voting rules including a class of scoring rules which includes the plurality, k-approval,
k-veto, veto, and Borda voting rules, maximin, Copelandα for every α ∈ [0, 1], and simplified
Bucklin voting rules. Hence, in this work, we discover a fundamental vulnerability in using
minimax regret based approach in partial preferential setting and propose a novel way to
tackle it.
1 Introduction
Aggregating preferences of a set of agents over a set of alternatives is a fundamental problem in
voting theory which has been used in many applications in AI for making various decisions.
Prominent examples of such applications include collaborative filtering [PHG00], similarity
search [FKS03], winner determination in sports competitions [BBN14], etc. [MBC+16]. In
a typical scenario of voting, we have a set of alternatives, a tuple of “preferences”, called a pro-
file, over the set of alternatives, and a voting rule which chooses a set of alternatives as winners
based on the profile. Classically, preferences are often modeled as complete orders over the
set of alternatives. However, in typical applications of voting in AI, collaborative filtering for
example, the number of alternatives is huge and we have only partial orders over the set of
alternatives as preferences.
There have been many attempts to extend the use of voting theory in settings with incom-
plete preferences. The approach of Konczak and Lang [KL05] was to study the possible and
necessary winner problems. In these problems, the input is a profile of partial preferences
and we want to compute the set of alternatives who wins (under some fixed voting rule) in at
1
least one completion of the profile for the possible winner problem; for the necessary winner
problem, we want to compute the set of alternatives who wins in every completion of the pro-
file. There have been substantial research effort in the last decade to better understand these
two problems [LPR+07, PRVW07, Wal07, XC11, BHN09, CLMM10, BBN10, BRR11, LPR+12,
FRRS14, DMN16b, DMN16a, DMN17, DMN15, DM17]. One of the main criticisms of this ap-
proach is that the definition of a necessary winner is so strong that none of the alternatives
may satisfy it whereas the definition of a possible winner is so relaxed that a large number of
alternatives may satisfy it. Moreover, the computational problem of finding the set of possible
winners is NP-hard for most of the common voting rules (finding the set of necessary winners
is also co-NP-hard for some voting rules, ranked pairs for example) [XC11].
Lu and Boutilier [LB11] took a completely different approach to handle incomplete pref-
erences and proposed a worst case regret based approach for score based voting rules. These
voting rules assign some score to every alternative based on the profile and select the alter-
natives with the maximum (or minimum) score as winners. Many popular voting rules, for
example, scoring rules, maximin, Copeland, etc. are score based voting rules. For score based
voting rules, intuitively speaking, the worst case regret, called maximum regret in [LB11], of
declaring an alternative w as a winner is the maximum possible difference between the score of
w and the score of a winning alternative in any completion of the input partial profile; the win-
ners of a partial profile are the set of alternatives with the minimummaximum (called minimax)
regret. A completion of a partial profile is another profile where every preference is complete
and it respects the orderings of the corresponding preference in the partial profile. The minimax
regret based approach is not only theoretically robust as argued in [LB11] but also practically
appealing since computing winners is polynomial time solvable for all commonly used voting
rules.
1.1 Motivation
Although the minimax regret based approach enjoys many exciting features, it introduces a
new (which was not present in the classical setting with complete preferences) kind of attack
on the election which we call “manipulative elicitation.” That is, it may be possible to partially
elicit the preferences in such a way that makes some favorable alternative win the election. For
example, let us consider a plurality election E where an alternative, say w, is the top alternative
of one preference and another alternative, say x, is the top alternative of every other preference.
In a plurality election, the winners are the set of alternatives who appear as the top alternative
in the largest number of preferences. Hence, x is the unique winner in E. Let us now consider
a partial profile where, in every partial preference, only w and every other alternative who
is preferred less than w in the corresponding preference in E are comparable. Let us call the
resulting partial profile E′. If n is the number of preferences, then the minimax regret plurality
score of w in E′ is (n− 1) whereas the minimax regret plurality score of every other alternative
is n which makes w the unique winner of E′. We call this phenomenon manipulative elicitation.
The problem of manipulative elicitation is even more alarming in AI since, in many applications
(collaborative filtering for example), the parts of the preferences that will be elicited can often
be influenced and controlled in such settings.
1.2 Our Contribution
Our main contribution in this paper is the discovery of the manipulative elicitation attack in
regret based partial preferential setting. We also show that the corresponding computational
problem for manipulative elicitation is polynomial time solvable for every monotone voting rule
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which includes all commonly used score based voting rules [Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1].
Intuitively speaking, we call a score based voting rule monotone if improving the position of
some alternative in any (complete) preference can only improve its score; we defer its formal
definition till Section 2. To counter the negative result of Theorem 3.1, we introduce a param-
eter per pair of alternatives which specifies the minimum number of partial preferences where
these two alternatives should be comparable. We establish success of our approach by showing
that the new constraints make the corresponding computational task of manipulative elicitation
NP-complete for a large class of scoring rules [Theorem 4.1] which includes the plurality [The-
orem 4.2], veto [Theorem 4.3], k-approval for any k, and Borda voting rules [Corollary 4.1],
maximin [Theorem 4.4], Copelandα for every α ∈ [0, 1] [Theorem 4.5], and simplified Buck-
lin [Theorem 4.6] voting rules. We remark that there could be various ways to enforce lower
bounds on the number of partial preferences where a particular pair of alternatives is com-
parable. For example, this can be a feature in the applications which would allow users to
generate these bounds from some distribution which would in turn overrule the possibility of
such manipulation (due to our hardness results).
2 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
For a positive integer k, we denote the set {1, 2, . . . ,k} by [k]. Let A = {ai : i ∈ [m]} be a set ofm
alternatives. We denote the set of all subsets of A of cardinality 2 by
(
A
2
)
. A complete order over
the set A of alternatives is called a (complete) preference. We say that an alternative a ∈ A is
placed at the ℓth position (from left or from top) in a preference≻ if |{b ∈ A : b ≻ a}| = ℓ−1. We
denote the set of all possible preferences over A by L(A). A tuple ≻= (≻i)i∈[n] ∈ L(A)
n of n
preferences is called a profile. An election E is a tuple (≻,A) where ≻ is a profile over a set A of
alternatives. If not mentioned otherwise, we denote the number of alternatives and the number
of preferences bym and n respectively. A map rc : ⊎n,|A|∈N+L(A)
n −→ 2A\{∅} is called a voting
rule. Given an election E, we can construct from E a directed weighted graph GE which is called
the weighted majority graph of E. The set of vertices in GE is the set of alternatives in E. For any
two alternatives x and y, the weight of the edge (x,y) is DE(x,y) = NE(x,y)−NE(y, x), where
NE(a,b) is the number of preferences where the alternative a is preferred over the alternative
b for a,b ∈ A,a 6= b. Examples of some common voting rules are as follows.
⊲Positional scoring rules: An m-dimensional vector α = (α1,α2, . . . ,αm) ∈ N
m with α1 >
α2 > . . . > αm and α1 > αm for every m ∈ N naturally defines a voting rule — an alternative
gets score αi from a preference if it is placed at the i
th position, and the score of an alternative is
the sum of the scores it receives from all the preferences. The winners are the alternatives with
the maximum score. Scoring rules remain unchanged if we multiply every αi by any constant
λ > 0 and/or add any constant µ. Hence, we can assume without loss of generality that for any
score vector α, we have gcd((αi)i∈[m]) = 1 and there exists a j < m such that αℓ = 0 for all
ℓ > j. We call such an α a normalized score vector. If αi is 1 for i ∈ [k] and 0 otherwise, then, we
get the k-approval voting rule. The k-approval voting rule is also called the (m − k)-veto voting
rule. The 1-approval voting rule is called the plurality voting rule and the 1-veto voting rule is
called the veto voting rule. If αi = m − i for every i ∈ [m], then we get the Borda voting rule.
⊲Maximin: The maximin score of an alternative x is miny 6=xNE(x,y). The winners are the
alternatives with the maximum maximin score.
⊲Copelandα: Given α ∈ [0, 1], the Copelandα score of an alternative x is |{y 6= x : DE(x,y) >
0}| + α|{y 6= x : DE(x,y) = 0}|. The winners are the alternatives with the maximum Copeland
α
score.
⊲Simplified Bucklin: An alternative x’s simplified Bucklin score is the minimum number ℓ such
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that x is placed within the top ℓ positions in more than half of the preferences. The winners are
the alternatives with the lowest simplified Bucklin score.
We call a voting rule “score based” if the voting rule assigns some score to every alternative
based on the profile and chooses either the set of alternatives with the maximum score or
the set of alternatives with the minimum score as winners. All the above mentioned voting
rules are score based — positional scoring rules, maximin, and Copelandα for every α ∈ [0, 1]
select the set of alternatives with the maximum score as winners and the simplified Bucklin
voting rule selects the set of alternatives with the minimum score as winners. We now define
few properties of a score based voting rule which will be relevant to us. We say that a score
based voting rule s is monotone if, for every positive integer n, every two profiles (≻i)i∈[n]
and (≻′i)i∈[n] over any finite set A of alternatives, and every alternative x ∈ A such that {y ∈
A : x ≻i y} ⊆ {y ∈ A : x ≻
′
i y} for every i ∈ [n], we have s(x, (≻i)i∈[n]) 6 s(x, (≻
′
i)i∈[n]).
We call a voting rule r neutral if, for every positive integer n, every profile (≻i)i∈[n] over any
finite set A = {xi : i ∈ [m]} of m alternatives, and every permutation σ of [m], we have
σ(r((≻i)i∈[n])) = r((σ(≻i))i∈[n]) where σ(r((≻i)i∈[n])) is the image of r((≻i)i∈[n]) under σ
and σ(≻i) = xσ(1) ≻ xσ(2) ≻ · · · ≻ xσ(m) if ≻i= x1 ≻ x2 ≻ · · · ≻ xm. We call a voting rule
worst efficient if the worst possible score with n preferences overm alternatives can be computed
in a polynomial (in m and n) amount of time. We observe that all the voting rules mentioned
above are neutral, worst efficient, and monotone if, for the case of simplified Bucklin voting
rule, we replace the simplified Bucklin score with negative of that and choose the alternative
with the maximum score.
2.1 Incomplete Election and Minimax Regret Extension of Score Based Voting
Rules
Although preferences are classically modeled as complete orders, in many scenarios, preferences
can be any partial order over A. We often denote a partial order R by the set {(a,b) : a,b ∈
A,aRb}. Given a profile P of partial preferences (which we call a partial profile), we denote the
set of all completions of P to complete orders by C(P). Lu and Boutilier [LB11] proposed a novel
approach to extend the use of score based voting rules for settings with partial profiles based
on a notion of regret. Let s be a score based voting rule so that the winner is an alternative
with the maximum score. Positional scoring rules, maximin, Copelandα for every α ∈ [0, 1],
etc. are prominent examples of such score based voting rules. Let us denote the score that a
score based voting rule s assigns to an alternative a ∈ A in a profile ≻∈ L(A)n by s(a,≻).
We denote the minimax regret voting rule based on a voting rule s by s. For a profile ≻, let
s(≻) = argmaxa∈A{s(a,≻)}. Given a partial profile P and a score based rule s, s(P) is defined
as follows.
s− Regret(a,≻) = |s(s(≻),≻) − s(a,≻)|
s−MR(a,P) = max
≻∈C(P)
s− Regret(a,≻)
s(P) = argmin
a∈A
s−MR(a,P)
We remark that Lu and Boutilier [LB11] defined s − Regret(a,≻) without the absolute
operator on the right; we choose to do so to take care of the simplified Bucklin voting rule. For
a partial profile P and a minimax regret (MR for short) voting rule s, we say that an alternative
a ∈ A co-wins if a ∈ s(P) and wins uniquely if s(P) = {a}. For an alternative a ∈ A, if
s − MR(a,P) = s − Regret(a,≻) for some ≻∈ C(P), then we call an alternative in s(≻) a
competing alternative of a in P.
4
We now formally define manipulative elicitation and the basic computational problem of
manipulative elicitation for a score based voting rule s.
Definition 2.1 (s-manipulative elicitation). For a profile ≻ over a set A of alternatives, we say
that a partial profile P is called a manipulative elicitation if ≻∈ C(P) and s(P) = {c}.
Definition 2.2 (s-MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION). Given a set A of alternatives, a profile ≻∈ L(A)n
of n preferences, and an alternative c ∈ A, compute if there exists a partial profile P such that
≻∈ C(P) and s(P) = {c}?
We will see in Theorem 3.1 that the s-MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION problem is polynomial
time solvable for every neutral, monotone, and worst efficient score based voting rule. This
shows that all the commonly used voting rule considered here are vulnerable under manipula-
tive elicitation. In the hope to counter this drawback, we extend the basic problem in Defini-
tion 2.2 to MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT in Definition 2.3. We will
indeed see in Section 4 that the MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT prob-
lem is NP-complete for all the voting rules that we consider in this paper. For a partial profile
≻= (≻i)i∈[n] and {a,b} ∈
(
A
2
)
, we denote the number of partial preferences in ≻ where a and
b are comparable by p{a,b}(≻).
Definition 2.3 (s-MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT). Given a set A of
alternatives, a profile ≻∈ L(A)n of n voters, a function f :
(
A
2
)
−→ N such that 0 6 f({a,b}) 6 n
for every {a,b} ∈
(
A
2
)
, and an alternative x ∈ A, compute if there exists a partial profile P such
that ≻∈ C(P), f({a,b}) 6 p{a,b}(≻) for every {a,b} ∈
(
A
2
)
and s(P) = {x}?
We remark that both the computational problems in Definition 2.2 and 2.3 have been de-
fined for the unique winner case; we could as well define these problems for the co-winner
case also. It turns out that all our proofs (except Theorem 3.1) can be easily modified for the
co-winner counterpart and our choice for defining these problems in the unique winner setting
is only a matter of exposition.
3 Polynomial Time Algorithm for MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION
Our first result is Theorem 3.1 which shows that the MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION problem is
polynomial time solvable for a large class of voting rules.
Theorem 3.1. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION problem is polynomial time solvable for every
monotone, neutral, and worst efficient score based voting rule s.
Proof. Let (A,≻= (≻i)i∈[n], c) be an arbitrary instance of s-MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION. We
first observe that every instance of s-MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION for the co-winner case is a
YES instance since, due to neutrality of s, c ∈ A = s((∅)n) and ≻∈ L(A)n = C((∅)n). So,
let us consider the unique winner case. Our algorithm is as follows. If c receives the worst
possible score in ≻, then we output NO; otherwise we output YES. Our algorithm runs in
polynomial time since s is worst efficient. To prove the correctness of our algorithm, we begin
with Claim 3.1 below.
Claim 3.1. If the score of c in ≻ is the worst possible score (say βn) that any alternative in A can
possibly receive in any profile with n preferences under the voting rule s, then the s-MANIPULATIVE
ELICITATION instance is a NO instance.
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Proof. Suppose not, then let us assume that R = (Ri)i∈[n] be a partial profile such that ≻∈ C(R)
and s(R) = {c}. Let s −MR(c,R) = s(s(≻′),≻′) − s(c,≻′) for some ≻′= (≻′i)i∈[n] ∈ C(R). We
now claim the following.
Claim 3.2. s(c,≻′) = βn.
Proof. The idea of the proof is that if s(c,≻′) > βn, then we can construct another profile which
can be used to calculate worse regret for c than ≻′ and this will contradict the choice of ≻′.
Formally, let us define another profile ≻¯ = (≻¯i)i∈[n] where ≻¯i is obtained from ≻
′
i by “moving”
c immediately to the right of the alternatives that are on the left of c in either ≻′i or ≻i for
i ∈ [n]; that is, for every i ∈ [n], ≻¯i is defined as follows.
≻¯i = {(a,b) : a,b ∈ A \ {c},a ≻
′
i b}
∪ {(c,a) : a ∈ A, c ≻′i a, c ≻i a}
∪ {(a, c) : a ∈ A,a ≻′i c or a ≻i c}
The profile ≻¯ ∈ C(R) since ≻∈ C(R) and ≻′∈ C(R). Due to monotonicity of s, the score of c
in ≻¯ is at most the score of c in ≻′ and the score of every other alternative in ≻¯ is at least their
score in ≻′. However, ≻′ has been used to calculate the MR score of c under s. Hence, we have
the following:
s(s(≻′),≻′) = s(s(≻¯),≻′), s(c,≻′) = s(c, ≻¯)
We now have the following:
βn 6 s(c,≻
′) = s(c, ≻¯) 6 s(c,≻) = βn
The first inequality follows from the definition of βn and the second inequality follows from
monotonicity of s.
Let y ∈ s(≻′) and s−MR(y,R) = s(s(≻′′),≻′′) − s(y,≻′′) for some ≻′′= (≻′′i )i∈[n] ∈ C(R).
We now have the following claim.
Claim 3.3. s(s(≻′′),≻′′) 6 s(s(≻′),≻′)
Proof. The idea of the proof is along the same line as Claim 3.2. Let us define another profile
≻¯ = (≻¯i)i∈[n] where ≻¯i is obtained from ≻
′′
i by “moving” c immediately to the right of the
alternatives that are on the left of c in either ≻′′i or ≻
′
i for i ∈ [n]; that is, for every i ∈ [n], ≻¯i
is defined as follows.
≻¯i = {(a,b) : a,b ∈ A \ {c},a ≻
′′
i b}
∪ {(c,a) : a ∈ A, c ≻′′i a, c ≻
′
i a}
∪ {(a, c) : a ∈ A,a ≻′′i c or a ≻
′
i c}
The profile ≻¯ ∈ C(R) since ≻′∈ C(R) and ≻′′∈ C(R). Due to monotonicity of s, the score of
c in ≻¯ is at most the score of c in ≻′′ and the score of every other alternative in ≻¯ is at least
their score in ≻′′. Again due to monotonicity of s, the score of c in ≻¯ is at most the score of
c in ≻′. However, ≻′ has been used to calculate the MR score of c under s. Hence, we have
s(s(≻′′),≻′′) 6 s(s(≻′),≻′); otherwise we will have s−Regret(c,≻′) < s−Regret(c, ≻¯) which
is a contradiction.
6
We now combine Claim 3.2 and 3.3 as follows to prove the main claim.
s−MR(y,R) = s(s(≻′′),≻′′) − s(y,≻′′)
6 s(s(≻′),≻′) − s(y,≻′′)
6 s(s(≻′),≻′) − βn
= s(s(≻′),≻′) − s(c,≻′)
= s−MR(c,R)
The second line follows from Claim 3.3, the third line follows from the definition of βn, and
the fourth line follows from Claim 3.2. Hence we have s − MR(y,R) 6 s −MR(c,R) which
contradicts our assumption that s(R) = {c}.
We now show that if c does not receive the worst possible score with n preferences over A
under s from the profile ≻, then the instance is a YES instance. To see this, let us consider the
partial profile P = (Pi)i∈[n] as Pi = {c ≻ y : c ≻i y} for every i ∈ [n]. Let R be any profile
in C(P). Since, the alternative c does not receive the worst possible score with n preferences
over A under s from the profile ≻, s(c,R) < βn. Hence, if α is the best possible score with
n preferences over A under s, we have s − MR(c,P) < α − βn. On the other hand, for any
alternative y ∈ A \ {c}, let us consider the profile Qy = (Qi)i∈[n] where Qi = c ≻ · · · ≻ y for
every i ∈ [n]. Now due to monotonicity of s, we have s(c,Qy) = α and s(y,Qy) = βn. Hence,
we have s−MR(y,P) = α − βn for every y ∈ A \ {c} and thus s(P) = {c}.
We remark that the proof of Theorem 3.1 for the co-winner case is trivial: every instance is
a YES instance since a partial profile where every preference is empty makes every alternative
win due to neutrality. Since scoring rules, maximin, Copelandα for every α ∈ [0, 1], and simpli-
fied Bucklin voting rules are monotone, neutral, and worst efficient, Theorem 3.1 immediately
implies the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION problem is polynomial time solvable for scoring
rules, maximin, Copelandα for every α ∈ [0, 1], and simplified Bucklin voting rules.
Proof. The worst possible score with n preferences over m alternatives is 0 for scoring rules,
maximin, and Copeland α for every α ∈ [0, 1], and −m for the simplified Bucklin voting rule
(under modified but equivalent definition of simplified Bucklin voting rule).
4 Hardness Results for MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE
PAIR LIMIT
In this section we show that the MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT prob-
lem is NP-complete for maximin, Copelandα for every α ∈ [0, 1], simplified Bucklin, and a large
class of scoring rules which includes the k-approval voting rule for every k and the Borda voting
rule.
4.1 Scoring Rules
Let us define a restricted version of the classical set cover problem which we call SET COVER
FREQUENCY TWO. We will see in Lemma 4.1 that this problem is NP-complete by reducing
from the vertex cover problem which is well known to be NP-complete [GJ79]. Most of our
NP-hardness reductions are from this problem.
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Definition 4.1 (SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO). Given a universe U of cardinality q, a family
S = {Si : i ∈ [t]} of t subsets of U such that for every a ∈ U, we have |{i ∈ [t] : a ∈ Si}| = 2,
and a positive integer ℓ, compute if there exists a subset G ⊆ S containing at most ℓ sets such that
∪A∈GA = U. We denote an arbitrary instance of SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO by (U, S, ℓ).
Lemma 4.1. SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO is NP-complete.
Proof. SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO clearly belongs to NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce
from VERTEX COVER to SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO. Let (G = (V,E),k) be an arbitrary instance
of VERTEX COVER. We construct and instance (U, S, ℓ) as follows:
U = {ae : e ∈ E}, S = {Sv : v ∈ V} where Sv = {ae : e is incident on v}, ℓ = k
Clearly every element ae ∈ U belongs to exactly two sets, namely Su and Sv if e = {u, v}.
Also the equivalence of two instances are straight forward.
We begin with showing that the MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT
problem is NP-complete for a large class of scoring rules which included the k-approval voting
rule for every 3 6 k 6 γm for any constant 0 < γ < 1 and the Borda voting rule. While
describing a (complete) preference, if we do not mention the order of any two alternatives,
they can be ordered arbitrarily. On the other hand, if we are describing a partial preference
and we do not mention the order of any two alternatives, then they should be assumed to be
incomparable.
Theorem 4.1. Let r be a normalized scoring rule such that there exists a function g : N −→ N such
that for every m ∈ N, we have 3m 6 g(m) 6 poly(m) and if α = (αi)i∈[g(m)], then there exists
a positive integer p such that 3 6 p 6 g(m) −m + 3,αp > αp+1 and αp−1 = poly(m). Then the
MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem is NP-complete for the scoring
rule r.
Proof. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem clearly belongs to
NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO to MANIPULATIVE
ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT for the scoring rule r. Let (U = {u1, . . . ,uq}, S =
{Si : i ∈ [t]}, ℓ) be an arbitrary instance of SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO. Let us consider the
following instance (A,P, c, f) of MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT where
A is defined as follows.
A = {ai : i ∈ [q]} ∪ {c,d} ∪W, whereW = {w1, . . . ,wg(q)−q−2}
The profile P consists of the following preferences. For an integer 0 6 k 6 g(q) − q− 2, we
denote the set {wi : i ∈ [k]} by Wk. Let κ = max{i ∈ [g(q)] : αi 6= 0}; we observe that ακ = 1
since r is normalized. For X ⊆ U, let us denote the set {aj : uj ∈ X} of alternatives by X to
simplify notation.
⊲ ∀i ∈ [t] : Wp−3 ≻ Si ≻ d ≻ c ≻ (U \ Si) ≻ (W \Wp−3)
⊲ t− 2 copies of Wp−1 ≻ ai ≻ d ≻ (U \ {ai}) ≻ (W \Wp−1) ≻ c
⊲ t(αp−αp+2) copies ofW2 ≻ · · · ≻ c ≻ · · ·d where the alternative c is placed at κ position
from left.
⊲ If αg(q)−1 = 1, then we add (q + 1)tαp−1 copies of · · · ≻ c ≻ d
⊲ Otherwise:
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– If κ 6 g(q) − q− 1, then we add (q+ 1)tαp−1 copies ofW2 ≻ · · · ≻ c ≻ d ≻ U ≻ · · ·
where the alternative d is placed at κ + 1 position from left and we add, for every
i ∈ [q], (q + 1)tαp−1 copies of W2 ≻ · · · ≻ ai ≻ d ≻ c ≻ (U \ {ai}) ≻ · · · where the
alternative d is placed at κ+ 1 position from the left.
– Otherwise we add (q + 1)tαp−1 copies of W2 ≻ · · · ≻ U ≻ c ≻ d ≻ · · · where the
alternative d is placed at κ+ 1 position from the left.
For ease of reference, we call the above four groups as G1,G2,G3, and G4 respectively. Let n
be the number of preferences in P. We observe that n = poly(m) since αp−1 = poly(m). The
function f is defined as follows: f({d, x}) = n for every x ∈ A\ ({c,d}), f({d, c}) = n− ℓ; the value
of f be 0 for all other pairs of alternatives. This finishes the description of our reduced instance.
We now claim that the two instances are equivalent.
In one direction, let us assume that the SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO instance is a YES
instance; without loss of generality, let us assume (by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sℓ forms a set
cover of U. Let us consider the following partial profile Q with P ∈ L(Q).
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i ∈ [ℓ] : ((Wp−3 ∪ Si) ≻ d ≻ ((U\ Si)∪ (W \Wp−3))
⋃
c ≻ ((U\ Si))∪
((W \Wp−3)))
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i with ℓ + 1 6 i 6 t : (Wp−3 ∪ Si) ≻ d ≻ c ≻ ((U \ Si) ∪ (W \Wp−3)
⊲ Preferences in G2: t− 2 copies of (Wp−1 ∪ ai) ≻ d ≻ ((U \ {ai}) ∪ (W \Wp−1) ∪ {c})
⊲ Preferences in G3: t(αp − αp+2) copies of c ≻ X where the alternative X = {b ∈ A : c ≻
b in G3}.
⊲ Preferences in G4: for every preference in G4, we add c ≻ Y where the alternative Y =
{b ∈ A : c ≻ b in the corresponding preference in G4}.
Let ∆ be the score that the alternativew1 receives in P. We observe that the minimum scores
that the alternatives c and ai, i ∈ [q] receive in profile R with R ∈ L(Q) are all the same; let it
be λ. We summarize the MR score (based on r) of every alternative from Q in Table 1. Hence
the alternative c wins uniquely in Q.
Alternative MR-r score from Q Competing alternative
c ∆− tαℓ − λ w1 (or w2)
ai,∀i ∈ [q] ∆− tαℓ + αℓ+1 − λ w1 (or w2)
w1(w2) ∆ w2(w1)
w ∈W \W2 ∆ w1
d > D− tαℓ w1 (or w2)
Table 1: Summary of MR scores (based on r) of all the alternatives from the partial profile Q in
the proof of Theorem 4.1.
In the other direction, let us assume that the MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE
PAIR LIMIT instance (A,P, c, f) is a YES instance. Let Q be a partial profile such that P ∈ C(Q)
and the alternative c wins uniquely in Q under the MR scoring rule based on r. We observe that
if a preference profile Rc with Rc ∈ L(Q) is used to calculate the MR score of the alternative
based on r, then the MR score of c based on r is at least ∆ − tαℓ − λ using the alternative w1
as a competing alternative where λ and ∆ are as defined above. Let J ⊆ [t] be the set of i ∈ [t]
such that the corresponding partial preferences in the group G1 in Q leave the alternatives c and
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d incomparable. Since f({d, c}) = n − ℓ, we have |J| 6 ℓ. We claim that {Sj : j ∈ J} forms a set
cover of U. Suppose not, then let uk ∈ U \ (∪j∈JSj). Then we observe that the MR score of ak
based on r is at least ∆− tαℓ − λ using the alternative w1 as a competing alternative.However,
this contradicts our assumption that c is the unique MR-r winner of Q. Hence {Sj : j ∈ J} forms
a set cover of U and thus the SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO is a YES instance. This concludes the
proof of the theorem.
Theorem 4.1 immediately gives us the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem is NP-
complete for the Borda and k-approval voting rules for every 3 6 k 6 γm for any constant
0 < γ < 1.
A drawback of Theorem 4.1 is that it does not cover the plurality, 2-approval, and the k-veto
voting rules for k = o(m). We will show that the MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE
PAIR LIMIT problem is NP-complete for the k-veto voting rule for any 1 6 k 6 γm for any
constant 0 < γ < 1 in Theorem 4.3. We now show in Theorem 4.2 that the MANIPULATIVE ELIC-
ITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem is NP-complete for the plurality and 2-approval
voting rules by reducing it from the X3C problem which is defined as follows and known to be
NP-complete [GJ79].
Definition 4.2 (X3C). Given a universe U of cardinality q such that q is divisible by 3, a family
S = {Si : i ∈ [t]} of t subsets of U each of cardinality 3, compute if there exists a subset G ⊆ F of
q/3 sets such that ∪A∈GA = U. We denote an arbitrary instance of X3C by (U, S).
Theorem 4.2. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem is NP-
complete for the plurality and the 2-approval voting rules.
Proof. Let us first consider the plurality voting rule. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CAN-
DIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem for the plurality voting rule clearly belongs to NP. To prove NP-
hardness, we reduce from X3C to MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT for
the plurality voting rule. Let (U = {u1, . . . ,uq}, S = {Si : i ∈ [t]}) be an arbitrary instance of
X3C. For every i ∈ [q] let us define fi = |{j ∈ [t] : ui ∈ Sj}|. Let us assume, without loss of
generality, that fi < t−q/2 (if not, then we add 3t new elements in U and t sets in S each of size
3 and collectively covering these new 3t elements). Let us assume, without loss of generality,
that q is divisible by 6; if not then we add 3 new elements in U and a set consisting of these
three new elements in S. Let us consider the following instance (A,P, c, f) of MANIPULATIVE
ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT where A is defined as follows.
A = {ai : i ∈ [q]} ∪ {c,d,w}
The profile P consists of the following preferences. For X ⊆ U, let us also denote, for the
sake of simplicity of notation, the set {aj : uj ∈ X} of alternatives by X.
⊲ ∀i ∈ [t] : d ≻ Si ≻ c ≻ (U \ Si) ≻ w
⊲ q/6 + 1 copies of c ≻ (A \ {c,w})
⊲ 1 copy of d ≻ w ≻ c ≻ (A \ {d,w})
For ease of reference, we call the above three groups as G1,G2, and G3 respectively. Let n be
the number of preferences in P. That is, n = t + q/6 + 2. The function f is defined as follows:
f({c,ai}) = n − fi + 1 for every i ∈ [q], f({w,d}) = n − 1, f({w, x}) = n for every x ∈ A \ {w,d};
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the value of f be 0 for all other pairs of alternatives. This finishes the description of our reduced
instance. We now claim that the two instances are equivalent.
In one direction, let us assume that the X3C instance is a YES instance; without loss of
generality, let us assume (by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sq/3 forms a set cover of U. Let us consider
the following partial profile Q with P ∈ L(Q).
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i ∈ [q/3] : (Si ≻ c ≻ (U \ Si) ≻ w)
⋃
(d ≻ w)
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i with q/3 + 1 6 i 6 t : (c ≻ (U \ Si) ≻ w)
⋃
(d ≻ w)
⊲ Preferences in G2: q/6 + 1 copies of c ≻ (A \ {c,w})
⊲ Preferences in G3: 1 copy of w ≻ c ≻ (A \ {d,w})
We summarize the MR-plurality score of every alternative from Q in Table 2. Hence the
alternative c wins uniquely in Q.
Alternative MR-plurality score from Q Competing alternative
c t− q/6 d
ai,∀i ∈ [q] t d
d t− q/6 + 1 c
Table 2: Summary of MR-plurality scores of all the alternatives from the partial profile Q in the
proof of Theorem 4.2.
In the other direction, let us assume that the MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE
PAIR LIMIT instance (A,P, c, f) is a YES instance. Let Q be a partial profile such that P ∈ C(Q)
and the alternative c wins uniquely in Q under the MR-plurality voting rule. Let J ⊆ [t] be the
set of i ∈ [t] such that the corresponding partial preferences in the group G1 in Q leave the
alternatives c and at least one alternative in Si incomparable. A key observation is that since
f({c,ai}) = n−fi+1 for i ∈ [q], we have ∪j∈JSj = U. Hence we have |J| > q/3. We now claim that
|J| 6 q/3. Suppose not, then the MR-plurality score of d is at most (t−q/3−1)+q/6+1 = t−q/6
using c as competing alternative (we observe that, since f({c,ai}) = n − fi + 1 for i ∈ [q],
using the alternative ai as a competing alternative for any i will lead to MR-plurality score of
d at most 2fi < t − q/6). Hence the MR-plurality score of d is at most t − q/6. However the
MR-plurality score of c is at least t + 1 − (q/6 + 1) = t − q/6. This contradicts our assumption
that c is the unique MR-plurality winner of Q. Hence {Sj : j ∈ J} forms a set cover of U and thus
the X3C is a YES instance. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
For the 2-approval voting rule, we can introduce n dummy alternatives each of which ap-
pears at the first position in exactly one preference and in the rest (n−1) preferences, it appears
in the bottom (n − 1) positions. All other parameters of the reduction remain same. It is easy
to see that a similar argument will prove the result for the 2-approval voting rule.
We now show our hardness result for the k-veto voting rule by reducing from X3C.
Theorem 4.3. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem is NP-
complete for the k-veto voting rule for every 1 6 k 6 γm for any constant 0 < γ < 1.
Proof. Let us first consider the veto voting rule. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDI-
DATE PAIR LIMIT problem for the veto voting rule clearly belongs to NP. To prove NP-hardness,
we reduce from X3C to MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT for the veto
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voting rule. Let (U = {u1, . . . ,uq}, S = {Si : i ∈ [t]}) be an arbitrary instance of X3C. For every
i ∈ [q] let us define fi = |{j ∈ [t] : ui ∈ Sj}|. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that
fi < t − q/2 (if not, then we add 3t new elements in U and t sets in S each of size 3 and col-
lectively covering these new 3t elements). Let us assume, without loss of generality, that q is
divisible by 6; if not then we add 3 new elements in U and a set consisting of these three new
elements in S. We also assume that t is an odd integer; if not then we duplicate one set in S. Let
us consider the following instance (A,P, c, f) of MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE
PAIR LIMIT where A is defined as follows.
A = {ai : i ∈ [q]} ∪ {c, x,d,w1,w2}
The profile P consists of the following preferences. For X ⊆ U, let us also denote, for the
sake of simplicity of notation, the set {aj : uj ∈ X} of alternatives by X.
1. ∀i ∈ [t] : (U \ Si) ≻ w1 ≻ w2 ≻ d ≻ c ≻ Si ≻ x
2. (t−1)/2 + q/6 copies of (A \ {c,d}) ≻ d ≻ c
3. ∀j ∈ [q] : (t+1)/2 + q/6 + 1− fj copies of (A \ {aj,d}) ≻ d ≻ aj
4. 10t copies of (A \ {d}) ≻ d
5. 10t copies of (A \ {d,w1,w2}) ≻ d ≻ w1 ≻ w2
6. ∀i ∈ [2] : q/3 copies of (A \ {wi,d}) ≻ d ≻ wi
For ease of reference, we call the above six groups as G1,G2,G3,G4,G5 and G6 respectively. Let n
be the number of preferences in P. The function f is defined as follows: f({d, z}) = n for every
z ∈ A \ {d}; the value of f be 0 for all other pairs of alternatives. This finishes the description of
our reduced instance. We now claim that the two instances are equivalent.
In one direction, let us assume that the SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO instance is a YES
instance; without loss of generality, let us assume (by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sq/3 forms a set
cover of U. Let us consider the following partial profile Q with P ∈ L(Q).
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i ∈ [q/3] : (U \ Si) ≻ w1 ≻ w2 ≻ d ≻ c ≻ Si ≻ x
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i with q/3 + 1 6 i 6 t : (U \ Si) ≻ w1 ≻ w2 ≻ d ≻ c ≻ (Si ∪ {x})
⊲ Preferences in G2: (t−1)/2 + q/6 copies of (A \ {c,d}) ≻ d ≻ c
⊲ Preferences in G3: ∀j ∈ [q] : (t+1)/2 + q/6 + 1− fj copies of (A \ {aj,d}) ≻ d ≻ aj
⊲ Preferences in G4: 10t copies of (A \ {d,w1,w2}) ≻ d ≻ {w1,w2}
⊲ Preferences in G5: 10t copies of (A \ {d}) ≻ d
⊲ Preferences in G6: ∀i ∈ [2] : q/3 copies of (A \ {wi,d}) ≻ d ≻ wi
We summarize the MR-veto score of every alternative from Q in Table 3. Hence the alterna-
tive c wins uniquely in Q.
In the other direction, let us assume that the MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE
PAIR LIMIT instance (A,P, c, f) is a YES instance. Let Q be a partial profile such that P ∈ C(Q)
and the alternative c wins uniquely in Q under the MR-veto voting rule. We first observe that,
since f({d, z}) = n for every z ∈ A \ {d}, the alternative c is forced to receive a score of 0 from
every preference in Q corresponding to group G2 (and thus every other alternative is forced to
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Alternative MR-veto score from Q Competing alternative
c (t−1)/2 − q/6 x (or w1 or w2)
x (t+1)/2 − q/6 c
ai,∀i ∈ [q] (t+1)/2 − q/6 x (or w1 or w2)
d > 5t x (or w1 or w2)
w1(w2) > 5t w2(w1)
Table 3: Summary of MR-veto scores of all the alternatives from the partial profile Q in the
proof of Theorem 4.3.
receive a score of 1), both the alternatives x and c are forced to receive a score of 1 from every
preference in Q corresponding to group G3, and the alternative d is forced to receive a score
of 0 from every preference in Q corresponding to group G4 (and thus every other alternative is
forced to receive a score of 1). We now claim that there must be at least q/3 preferences in Q
corresponding to the group G1 where the alternative xmust be forced to receive a score of 0 for c
to win uniquely. Suppose not, then we observe that the MR-veto score of c is at least (t+1)/2−q/6
using x as a competing alternative whereas the MR-veto score of x is at most (t−1)/2−q/6 using c
as a competing alternative which contradicts our assumption that c wins the MR-veto election.
Let J ⊆ [t] be the set of i ∈ [t] such that the corresponding partial preferences in the group G1
in Q force the alternative x to receive a score of 0. Then we have |J| > q/3. We now claim that
|J| = q/3 and the sets {Sj : j ∈ J} forms an exact set cover of U. Suppose not, then there exists an
uk ∈ U which appears in at least two sets in {Sj : j ∈ J}. Then the alternative is forced to receive
a score of 1 from at least t − fk + 2 preferences in Q corresponding to the group G1 – t − fk
preferences where it appears on the left of d and at least 2 preferences where the alternative
x is forced to receive a score of 0. However, then the MR-veto score of the alternative ak is at
most (t−1)/2−q/6 using w1 (or w2) as a competing alternative. This contradicts our assumption
that c wins the MR-veto election uniquely. Hence the sets {Sj : j ∈ J} forms an exact set cover
of U and thus the X3C is a YES instance. This concludes the proof of the theorem for the veto
voting rule.
For the k-veto voting rule, we add k−1 “dummy” alternatives di, i ∈ [k−1] at the bottom of
every preferences in P and this is easily verifiable that the proof for the k-veto voting rule goes
along the same line.
4.2 Maximin Voting Rule
We now show our hardness result for the maximin voting rule by reducing from SET COVER
FREQUENCY TWO.
Theorem 4.4. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem is NP-
complete for the maximin voting rule.
Proof. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem clearly belongs
to NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO to MANIPU-
LATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT for the maximin voting rule. Let (U =
{u1, . . . ,uq}, S = {Si : i ∈ [t]}, ℓ) be an arbitrary instance of SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO. Let us
consider the following instance (A,P, c, f) of MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR
LIMIT where A is defined as follows.
A = {ai : i ∈ [q]} ∪ {c,w1,w2,d}
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The profile P consists of the following preferences. For X ⊆ U, let us also denote, for the
sake of simplicity of notation, the set {aj : uj ∈ X} of alternatives by X.
⊲ ∀i ∈ [t] : w1 ≻ w2 ≻ Si ≻ d ≻ c ≻ (U \ Si)
⊲ 2 copies of c ≻ U ≻ d ≻ w1 ≻ w2
For ease of reference, we call the above two groups as G1 and G2 respectively. Let n be the
number of preferences in P. The function f is defined as follows: f({d, x}) = n for every x ∈
A \ ({c,d}), f({d, c}) = n − ℓ; the value of f be 0 for all other pairs of alternatives. This finishes
the description of our reduced instance. We now claim that the two instances are equivalent.
In one direction, let us assume that the SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO instance is a YES
instance; without loss of generality, let us assume (by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sℓ forms a set
cover of U. Let us consider the following partial profile Q with P ∈ L(Q).
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i ∈ [ℓ] : (({w1,w2} ∪ Si) ≻ d ≻ {U \ Si})
⋃
(c ≻ {U \ Si})
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i with ℓ + 1 6 i 6 t : ({w1,w2} ∪ Si) ≻ d ≻ c ≻ {U \ Si}
⊲ Preferences in G2: 2 copies of c ≻ U ≻ d ≻ {w1,w2}
We summarize the MR-maximin score of every alternative from Q in Table 4. Hence the
alternative c wins uniquely in Q.
Alternative MR-maximin from Q Competing alternative Comments
c t− 2 w1 (or w2) N(w1, c) −N(c,d)
ai,∀i ∈ [q] t− 1 w1 (or w2) N(w1, c) −N(ai, c)
w1(w2) t w2(w1) N(w1, c) −N(w2,w1)
d t w1 (or w2) N(w1, c) −N(d,w1)
Table 4: Summary of MR-maximin scores of all the alternatives from the partial profile Q in the
proof of Theorem 4.4.
In the other direction, let us assume that the MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE
PAIR LIMIT instance (A,P, c, f) is a YES instance. Let Q be a partial profile such that P ∈ C(Q)
and the alternative c wins uniquely in Q under the MR-maximin voting rule. We observe that for
every R ∈ L(Q) which can be used for calculating the MR-maximin score of the alternative c,
we have NR(c,d) 6 2. Also, there are only two preferences (the preferences in G2) where there
exist some alternatives which are preferred over the alternative w1. Hence the MR-maximin
score of the alternative c in Q is at least t − 2. Let J ⊆ [t] be the set of i ∈ [t] such that the
corresponding partial preferences in the group G1 in Q leave the alternatives c and d incompa-
rable. Since f({d, c}) = n − ℓ, we have |J| 6 ℓ. We claim that {Sj : j ∈ J} forms a set cover of
U. Suppose not, then let uk ∈ U \ (∪j∈JSj). We observe that for every R
′ ∈ L(Q), we have
NR′(ak, c) = 2. We also observe that NR′(ak,d) = NR′(ak,wi) = 2 for every i ∈ [2] since
f({d,ui}) = n for every i ∈ [q] and f({d,w1}) = f({d,w2}) = n. Hence, the MR-maximin score
of the alternative ak is t− 2 where the alternative w1 plays the role of a competing alternative.
However, this contradicts our assumption that c is the unique MR-maximin winner of Q. Hence
{Sj : j ∈ J} forms a set cover of U and thus the SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO is a YES instance.
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
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4.3 Copelandα Voting Rule
We show next our hardness result for the Copelandα voting rule for every α ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 4.5. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem is NP-
complete for the Copelandα voting rule for every α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem clearly belongs to
NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO to MANIPULATIVE
ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT for the Copelandα voting rule for every α ∈ [0, 1].
Let (U = {u1, . . . ,uq}, S = {Si : i ∈ [t]}, ℓ) be an arbitrary instance of SET COVER FREQUENCY
TWO. Let us consider the following instance (A,P, c, f) of MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH
CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT where A is defined as follows.
A = {ai : i ∈ [q]} ∪ {c, x,y,d,w1,w2}}
The profile P consists of the following preferences. For X ⊆ U, let us also denote, for the
sake of simplicity of notation, the set {aj : uj ∈ X} of alternatives by X.
⊲ ∀i ∈ [t] : w1 ≻ w2 ≻ Si ≻ d ≻ c ≻ x ≻ y ≻ (U \ Si)
⊲ t− 3 copies of U ≻ c ≻ x ≻ y ≻ d ≻ w1 ≻ w2
For ease of reference, we call the above two groups as G1 and G2 respectively. Let n be the
number of preferences in P. We observe that n is an odd integer and thus the value of α is
irrelevant. Hence, from here on, we omit the parameter α. The function f is defined as follows:
f({d, x}) = n for every x ∈ A \ {c,d, x,w1,w2}, f({d, c}) = f({d, x}) = n − ℓ; the value of f be 0
for all other pairs of alternatives. This finishes the description of our reduced instance. We now
claim that the two instances are equivalent.
In one direction, let us assume that the SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO instance is a YES
instance; without loss of generality, let us assume (by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sℓ forms a set
cover of U. Let us consider the following partial profile Q.
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i ∈ [ℓ] : Si ≻ d ≻ y ≻ (U \ Si))
⋃
(c ≻ {{x,y} ∪ (U \ Si)})
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i with ℓ + 1 6 i 6 t : Si ≻ d ≻ x ≻ y ≻ (U \ Si)
⊲ Preferences in G2: t− 3 copies of c ≻ {x,d,w1,w2}
We summarize the MR-Copeland score of every alternative from Q in Table 5. Hence the
alternative c wins uniquely in Q.
In the other direction, let us assume that the MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE
PAIR LIMIT instance (A,P, c, f) is a YES instance. Let Q be a partial profile such that P ∈ C(Q)
and the alternative c wins uniquely in Q under the MR-Copeland voting rule. We observe that
in P, the alternative c defeats only 2 alternatives namely x and y. Since, P ∈ L(Q), the MR-
Copeland score of the alternative c in Q is at least (|A| − 1) − 2 = |A| − 3. Let J ⊆ [t] be the
set of i ∈ [t] such that the corresponding partial preferences in Q leave the alternatives c and d
incomparable. Since f({d, c}) = n − ℓ for every i ∈ [t], we have |J| 6 ℓ. We claim that {Sj : j ∈ J}
forms a set cover of U. Suppose not, then let uk ∈ U\ (∪j∈JSj). We observe that in every profile
R ∈ L(Q), the alternative ak defeats the alternatives c and d and thus the MR-Copeland score of
the alternative ak in Q is at most (|A|−3) where the alternativew1 plays the role of a competing
alternative. However, this contradicts our assumption that c is the unique MR-Copeland winner
of Q. Hence {Sj : j ∈ J} forms a set cover of U and thus the SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO is a YES
instance. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
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Alternative MR-Copeland from Q Competing alternative Comments
c |A| − 3 w1 (or w2)
w1 defeats A \ {w1}
c defeats {x,y}
ai,∀i ∈ [q] |A| − 2 w1 (or w2)
w1 defeats A \ {w1}
ai defeats d
w1(w2) |A| − 1 w2(w1)
w1 defeats A \ {w1}
w2 defeats none
d |A| − 2 w2(w1)
w1 defeats A \ {w1}
d defeats y
Table 5: Summary of MR-Copeland scores of all the alternatives from the partial profile Q in the
proof of Theorem 4.5.
4.4 Simplified Bucklin Voting Rule
We now show our hardness result for the simplified Bucklin voting rule.
Theorem 4.6. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem is NP-
complete for the simplified Bucklin voting rule.
Proof. The MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT problem clearly belongs
to NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO to MANIPU-
LATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE PAIR LIMIT for the simplified Bucklin voting rule. Let
(U = {u1, . . . ,uq}, S = {Si : i ∈ [t]}, ℓ) be an arbitrary instance of SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO.
Let us consider the following instance (A,P, c, f) of MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDI-
DATE PAIR LIMIT where A is defined as follows.
A = {ai : i ∈ [q]} ∪ {c,d} ∪W, whereW = {wi : i ∈ [q]}
The profile P consists of the following preferences. For X ⊆ U, let us also denote, for the
sake of simplicity of notation, the set {aj : uj ∈ X} of alternatives by X.
⊲ ∀i ∈ [t] : w1 ≻ w2 ≻ · · · ≻ wq−2 ≻ Si ≻ d ≻ c ≻ (U \ Si) ≻ wq−1 ≻ wq
⊲ t− 1 copies of U ≻ c ≻ d ≻W
⊲ 2 copies of w1 ≻ w2 ≻ · · · ≻ wq ≻ c ≻ d ≻ U
For ease of reference, we call the above three groups as G1,G2, and G3 respectively. Let n
be the number of preferences in P. The function f is defined as follows: f({d, x}) = n for
every x ∈ A \ ({c,d,w1, . . . ,wq−2}), f({d, c}) = n − ℓ; the value of f be 0 for all other pairs of
alternatives. This finishes the description of our reduced instance. We now claim that the two
instances are equivalent.
In one direction, let us assume that the SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO instance is a YES
instance; without loss of generality, let us assume (by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sℓ forms a set
cover of U. Let us consider the following partial profile Q with P ∈ L(Q).
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i ∈ [ℓ] : (Si ≻ d ≻ (U \ Si) ≻ wq−1 ≻
wq)
⋃
(c ≻ (U \ Si) ≻ wq−1 ≻ wq)
⊲ Preferences in G1: ∀i with ℓ + 1 6 i 6 t : Si ≻ d ≻ c ≻ (U \ Si) ≻ wq−1 ≻ wq
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⊲ Preferences in G2: t− 1 copies of U ≻ c ≻ d ≻W
⊲ Preferences in G3: 2 copies of wq−1 ≻ wq ≻ c ≻ d ≻ U
We summarize the MR-simplified Bucklin score of every alternative from Q in Table 6. Hence
the alternative c wins uniquely in Q.
Alternative MR-simplified Bucklin score from Q Competing alternative
c −q w1
ai,∀i ∈ [q] −q− 1 w1
w1 −2q− 1 w2
wi, 2 6 i 6 q −2q− 1 w1
d −q− 1 w1
Table 6: Summary of MR-simplified Bucklin scores of all the alternatives from the partial profile
Q in the proof of Theorem 4.6.
In the other direction, let us assume that the MANIPULATIVE ELICITATION WITH CANDIDATE
PAIR LIMIT instance (A,P, c, f) is a YES instance. Let Q be a partial profile such that P ∈ C(Q)
and the alternative c wins uniquely in Q under the MR-simplified Bucklin voting rule. We can
assume without loss of generality that the alternative w1 is used as a competing alternative
to calculate MR-simplified Bucklin score of every alternative (other than w1 itself) since the
simplified Bucklin score of w1 is 1 (the minimum possible) in P and P ∈ C(Q). Let J ⊆ [t] be
the set of i ∈ [t] such that the corresponding partial preferences in the group G1 in Q leave
the alternatives c and d incomparable. Since f({d, c}) = n − ℓ, we have |J| 6 ℓ. We claim that
{Sj : j ∈ J} forms a set cover of U. Suppose not, then let uk ∈ U \ (∪j∈JSj). We observe that for
every R ∈ L(Q), the simplified Bucklin score of the alternative ak is at most q + 1. Hence the
MR-simplified Bucklin score of ak in Q is at least −q. On the other hand, since the simplified
Bucklin score of c in P is q + 1 and P ∈ C(Q), the MR-simplified Bucklin score of c in Q is at
most −q. However, this contradicts our assumption that c is the unique MR-simplified Bucklin
winner of Q. Hence {Sj : j ∈ J} forms a set cover of U and thus the SET COVER FREQUENCY TWO
is a YES instance. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we have discovered an important vulnerability, namely manipulative elicitation, in
the use of minimax regret based extension of classical voting rules in the incomplete preferential
setting. Moreover, we have shown that the related computational task is polynomial time solv-
able for many commonly used voting rules including all scoring rules, maximin, Copelandα for
every α ∈ [0, 1], simplified Bucklin voting rules, etc. Then we have shown that by introducing a
parameter per pair of alternatives which specifies the minimum number of partial preferences
where this pair of alternatives must be comparable makes the computational task of manipula-
tive elicitation NP-complete for all the above mentioned voting rules. We want to draw special
attention to the fact that our approach makes manipulative elicitation NP-complete even for the
plurality and veto voting rules which are vulnerable to most of the other manipulative attacks.
In summary, we have found an important vulnerability in the incomplete preferential setting
and proposed a novel approach to tackle it.
A drawback of our approach is that the parameters can be non-uniform – their values do not
need to be the same for every pair of alternatives. It would be interesting to study the computa-
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tional complexity of the problem when the values of the parameters are all the same. In another
direction, it would be interesting to conduct extensive experimentation to study usefulness of
our approach in practice. This is specially important since computational intractability is known
to provide only a weak barrier in other forms of election manipulation [PR07].
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